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 Abstract  
This study is conducted to examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the level of 
corporate tax planning activities (measured by Book Tax Differences (BTDs)) in non-financial companies l sted on 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). The study found that there is a positive significant relationship between CSR (overall) 
and the tax planning activities. This findings are consistent with legitimacy theory used to predict the relationship 
between CSR and tax planning, as companies is expected to carry out activities which are perceived legitimate to the 
companies’ sustainability. The theory predicts that there is no mutual relationship between CSR and tax pl nning 
activities since companies are operating under value maximisation principle, therefore any activities which are 
seemed legitimate are pursued.  
 




Tax planning activities have been given high pressure from the tax authority internationally. In the UK, The 
HMRC is very aggressive in tackling and finding the b st way to prevent tax avoidance by gradually 
introducing new anti-avoidances rules and regulations. They began their stricter enforcement with the 
introduction of The Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes (DOTAS)1 rules in year 2004, following by The 
Hampton Review in 2005 which acquire tax authorities to come out with the risk assessment on 
corporations in term of their potential engagement in tax avoidance (HM Treasury, 2004). Recently, they 
have come out with General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) (HM Treasury, 2012), which is aimed to tackle and 
deter the artificial and abusive tax avoidance scheme ngaged by taxpayers. Up to 2014, HMRC has listed 
23 tax avoidance schemes under their spotlight (HMRC, 2014).  
Therefore, companies engaging in tax avoidance are facing the risks of being audited and alleged under tax 
avoidance sanctions if found guilty. These processes would involve company’s significant risks and costs, 
which is financially and non-financially bad reputations for the company. Despites the stern pressures on 
tax planning activities, the tax gap reported is still ignificant. Recently, HMRC (2013) reported tha the 
UK tax gap is amounting £34 billion in 2013 and tax voidance involving corporation tax was 
approximately accounted for £1.3 billion between year 2012 – 2013.  
These circumstances have raised concerns within tax researches study on tax planning activities (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) triggered the notion of implementing efficient internal 
mechanisms such as CSR and corporate governance to combat high level of tax planning activities. The 
general question can be raised when linking CSR to the level of tax planning activities.  
Does attitude to CSR relates to attitude to tax planning? 
In order to answer the above question, understanding of the concept of CSR and tax planning is vital. 
These include their definitions and the embedded thories. CSR could be understood as broad concept of 
business activities where it is developed based on stakeholders’ mutual interest and companies’ 
perceptions upon the stakeholders’ important. CSR is always seen by scholars to advocate the balanced 
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responsibilities towards stakeholders and uphold moral and ethics values as its central discussions 
(Carroll, 1979; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Aguinis, 2011). Whereas, tax planning is defined as the 
reduction of explicit taxes which does not involve tax evasion which by definition is illegal (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). Tax planning also undertaken by companies to maximise returns (Scholes, Wolfson, 
Erickson, Maydew, & Shevlin, 1992). Tax planning activities are also undertaken due to several factors 
for example, inconveniencies due to the weaknesses in the tax system (Alm, 2014), philosophical 
assumptions about tax (Avi-Yonah, 2008), curiosity over the government budget and distributions 
(Hasseldine et al., 2011).  
The relationship of CSR and the level of tax planning could be argued based on organizational legitimacy 
theory and theory of value maximisation (Jensen, 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Though tax planning 
could maximise companies’ value, on the other hand t x also functions as a way for the government via ax 
authority to directly intervene into the companies’ corporate affairs (Avi-Yonah, 2004). As the authority, 
who possesses the power of assessing companies’ tax affairs and imposed penalties, tax authority could be 
influential stakeholder to the companies. Thus, high level of tax planning activities might be a threat to 
corporate organizational legitimacy (Holland et al.,2013). As CSR serve as balanced responsibility to 
multiple stakeholders, it is questioned whether its practice might relates to the level of corporate tax 
planning or both are undertaken as mutually independent as corporate strategy.  
Previous studies presented mixed results on the associ tions of CSR and the level of tax planning. Huseynov 
& Klamm (2012) found that socially responsible companies undertook less tax planning activities compared 
to socially irresponsible companies. Similar to Lanis & Richardson (2012) and Keung Hoi, Wu, & 
Zhang,(2013) , which companies with high CSR performance were associated with less tax avoidance 
activities. Watson (2011) on the other hand found that companies with high CSR performance exhibit high 
level of tax planning activities. The variations found in the previous studies could be explained by the 
conflicting theories surrounding the legitimacy of tax planning activities and CSR.  
This paper contributes to the CSR and tax planning literature particularly on the relationship of CSR and 
tax planning. The findings assist understanding corporate behaviours and the linkage between non-financ al 
and financial data. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews literature on CSR and 
tax planning and concluded by hypothesis development. Section III consists of data collection methods. 
Some descriptive and initial results will be presented in section IV followed by discussion in Section V. 
Section VI will conclude the paper.  
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
Legitimacy theory deals with the process of acquiring legitimate status or being acceptable or appraised by 
the societies (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) or possessing the stakeholders’ perception for long term survival 
(Suchman, 1995). Organisational legitimacy is translated into business environment by two approaches; 
strategic and institutional (Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995) explains that strategic legitimacy reflects the 
managerial perspective in an organisation to deploy and manipulate situations in order to gain supports 
from stakeholders. Whereas institutional legitimacy exhibits the ability of stakeholders to create cultural 
pressures on the orientation of companies’ activities (Suchman, 1995).  
Organisational legitimacy theory connotes two possible links between CSR and the level of tax 
planning. First, under strategic approach, company might find strategies to legitimise their actions 
(proactive or reactive approach) by managing the organisational legitimacy threat. This theory also 
suggest that there are limitations or the extent of any activities are supposed be carried on to stay 
relevant (Suchman, 1995; Van Der Laan, 2009). With the tax authority pressure and actions in 
tackling tax avoidance, CSR could be associated with the level of tax planning through the 
management of threats (risks) from tax authorities and the public (Carroll & Shabana, 2010; 
Crowson, 2009). Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld (1999) and O’Donovan (2002) have acknowledged 
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that threat or risks exposed by salient stakeholders are considered one of characteristics to 
determine stakeholder’s salient. This is in line with the claim made by Alm (2014), tax planning 
might be undertaken at a very high level and with limited economic justifications, there is a risk 
of those transactions would consist of illegal elements of tax evasion. Therefore, such activities 
are riskier for the companies if in case, the companies are being chosen to be audited and contested 
by tax authorities, exposing the chances to be punished and imposed tax penalty. Thus, companies 
have to bear costs of dealing with the tax audit and the risk of tax transaction being challenged as 
illegal and subsequently liable to the penalties, might in turn jeopardise companies reputation. The 
scrutiny would increase the risks and costs of tax avoidance activities (Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 
2003) will then influence company to reduce corporate t x avoidance activities (O’Donovan, 
2002).  
Thus, it is expected that companies accept the concept of CSR and have higher commitment in CSR would 
consider the stakeholders’ influential power and how it may potentially affect the company. If tax authority 
is able to provide potential threats to the company, it is therefore expected company with high CSR 
performance would be less engage in high level tax pl nning activities.  
Therefore, if tax authorities and the public are recognised by the company as salient or important then is 
theory predicts an adverse directional relationship between CSR and the level of tax planning. Thus, the 
directional hypothesis is:  
 
H1: There is a negative association between companies’ CSR and the level of tax planning  
 
However, from economic point of view, value maximisat on serves as priority of the company to stay in 
competitive environment. Therefore, if CSR and tax planning activities could enhance the value of the 
company, these activities should be perceived as legitimate tasks. This is in line with value-seeking purpose 
introduced by Jensen (2010) and as affirmed by Milton Friedman in 1970 and Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
that the main responsibility of a business is value maximisation. Jensen (2010) had quoted that “purposely 
behaviour requires existence of a single value objectiv  function” (Jensen, 2010: 34) and “total firm value 
maximisation makes society better off” (Jensen, 2010: 34) intensifying the important of setting value 
maximisation as main business agenda. Jensen (2010) contended that company should have one main 
objective to stay in competitive advantage and to survive. By setting a clear objective i.e. value 
maximisation or value-seeking behaviour, it is easir for the managers to make economic decision for the 
company (Jensen, 2010). He also claimed that social welfare is maximised when all companies in an 
economy attempt to maximise their own goals for example producing high quality output that beneficial to 
the society. Relating to CSR, there are vast amount f studies that CSR could improve financial performance 
(Lu & Liu, 2014). Attig et al. (2013) argued that although the benefits of CSR are difficult to be measured 
in the form of immediate effect on short term accounting profitability. CSR materialised more in the form 
of long-term strategic returns and intangible asset uch as reputation and relationship with stakeholders. 
This entails that moral and ethics, as central justifica ions in CSR theories play important roles forthe 
reputations obtained by companies (Attig et al., 2013). Based on the argument above, CSR and tax planning 
might be viewed as companies’ strategic approach to sustain profits where perhaps, no association of the 
company’s attitude to CSR in relation to the probability of the company engaging in tax avoidance 
activities. This argument anticipates that CSR practices and tax planning activities are distinctive and 
exhibit no mutual relationship except for value maximisation purpose. Consequently, these arguments 
contribute to a null hypothesis that there is no relationship of CSR and the level of tax planning.  
 
H0: There is no association between companies’ CSR and the level tax planning  
 
 Methods and Data 
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The sample frame of this study is non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the 
period of 2005 to 2012. The data for tax planning; book tax differences (BTD) will be extracted and hand 
collected from companies’ published financial reports in tax notes disclosures. The data for CSR corporate 
governance (CG) and companies specific characteristics (BSC) will be collected from from (ASSET4 ESG 
external ratings provided by Thompson Reuters) avail ble on Datastream and FAME from years 2005 to 
2012.  
Book Tax Differences (BTDs) is chosen as proxy to measure the level of tax planning as dependent variable 
of this study. BTD means the different between book income according to GAAP and taxable income 
reported by companies (Abdul Wahab & Holland, 2014; Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 2009). On that account, 
BTDs consist of elements of tax planning including ag ressive tax planning or tax avoidance (Abdul Wahab 
& Holland, 2014; Frank et al., 2009; Keung Hoi et al., 2013). The data for BTD was collected from annual 
reports of the sample companies. 
In addition, CSR is measured by using external ratings ASSET4 ESG databases provided by Thompson 
Reuters2 available on datastream. Most of researches ((Attig e  al., 2013; Davis, Guenther, Krull, & 
Williams, 2016; Keung Hoi et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Watson, 2011) conducted in CSR area 
had employed external ratings to reflect CSR activities or performances in the company. This is due to the 
qualities of external ratings in measuring of CSR have been recognised as timely accessible (Wood, 2010), 
comparable and transparent to stakeholders (Chatterji, L vine, & Toffel, 2009; Collison, Cobb, Power, & 
Stevenson, 2009). Wood (2010) also emphasised that third party ratings better addresses the nature of CSR. 
Since this paper aims to examine the relationship of CSR and the level of tax planning, therefore the 
regression model will be:  
HIJ =  + 1LIJ+ Σ19O5IJ+ QIJ  
 
 Data Collection and Results  
 
After matching the availability of external ratings data for CSR and BTD for the level of tax planning, there 
are 87 non-financial companies quoted on LSE are chosen for regression analysis. Since this study focus 
on 8 years data (2005-2012), there are 696 observations available. Out of 87 companies investigated, the 
average score for CSR is 68% with the maximum score of 98.27%. As for BTD, 47% of the sample 
companies reveal positive BTD. Based on the number companies having positive BTD, an initial regression 
analysis had been performed to examine the relationsh p between CSR and the level of tax planning. Table 
1 presents the regression result for this study: 
 
 
Lbtd  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>t  [95% Conf.  Interval]  
CSRall  .019744  .0045575  4.33  0.000  .0107734  .0287147  
log_assets  .7602449  .2087435  3.64  0.000  .3493641  1.171126  
Roa  .0185372  .0136379  1.36  0.175  -.0083069  .0453814  
Lev  .0016798  .0007246  2.32  0.021  .0002536  .0031 6  
Industrytyp
e  
.0282661  .0127869  2.21  0.028  .0030971  .0534352  
_cons  3.515374  1.182136  2.97  0.003  1.188514  5.842234  
       
 
The regression shows that R2 is 0.2533 indicating that the model as presented in Section 3 is able to explain 
25.33% the variability of relationship between CSR and the level of tax planning with the F-value of 0.000. 
Though this study expects negative relationship betwe n CSR and the level of tax planning, the regression 
analysis shows a contrary positive significant relationship between CSR and the level of tax planning with
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the p-value of 0.000 and r value indicates nearly 0.2 correlations. Other companies’ specific characteristics 
have positive significant relationship with the level of tax planning except for ROA.  
 
Discussion  
The regression analysis result is contrary to hypothesis 1 developed in Section 2. Based on 
organizational legitimacy theory, it is expected that companies with high CSR performance would 
be less engage in high level tax planning activities due to possible threats by the tax authorities 
such as tax audit and penalties. There is a relationsh p between CSR and the level of tax planning 
in a positive direction which means companies with high CSR performance still undertake tax 
planning activities. Companies might still undertake tax planning if they perceived that the tax 
authority is not their salient stakeholder. This is the case where they might find the threats are 
manageable. High CSR performance would also means companies might have other higher 
influential stakeholders other than the tax authoriies and the public. This result is in line with the 
argument made Seely (2015) where companies might continue to engage with tax avoidance 
activities if they perceive that other stakeholders have more influential power in the company’s 
operations and long-term continuity Therefore, their CSR directions are focused on other 
stakeholders which this event still contribute to high score of CSR performance.  
Although the analysis presents significant positive relationship, it also shows weak correlation 
between CSR and the level of tax planning. This might ndicate that though CSR is not a major 
influential factor for the company in undertaking their tax planning activities. This is in line with 
the argument made by Jensen (2010) that companies udertake activities which maximise value 
as main business agenda. Therefore, weak relationship might means that both activities, CSR and 
tax planning, are undertaken independently since these activities might increase the value of the 
companies in short and long term.  
The result of this study is similar to Watson (2011) which found that socially responsible companies (high 
score of CSR) are still engage in high level of tax planning activities more than socially irresponsible 
companies (lower score of CSR). It is claimed that companies would not sacrifice the tax savings benefit 
resulted from tax planning and would not keen to dedicate in CSR if it is not profitable. In addition, Cai et 
al. (2012) found that the CSR activities are being a choice of activities for long term enhancement, even in 
the case if controversial business sectors. As tax avoidance bring in the idea of unethical stem (Demirbag, 
Frecknall-Hughes, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2013), CSR performance which seemed noble by stakeholders are 
used to deviate the unethical issue. This is due to the concept of CSR which portrays good citizenship 
behaviour (Avi-Yonah, 2006; Donaldson, Preston, & Preston, 1995; Lantos, 2002). However, Holland et 
al. (2013) claimed that despite variations of companies’ respond to tax reputational threats in term of tax 




The results of this study reveal there is a relationship between CSR and the level of tax planning. Thoug  
the relationship is contrary to the hypothesis, this study provide an insight of possible relationship between 
CSR and the level of tax planning. This results of this study might be improved if the CSR are narrowed 
down to its particular dimensions and tax planning (BTDs) is segregated into its components such as 
permanent and temporary different.  
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